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Involuntary Civil Commitment: The Dangerousness Standard
and Its Problems
On October 16, 1981, James became confused and angry while driving his
automobile. Hearing voices that told him to kill himself, he suddenly acceler-
ated his vehicle and crashed into a car in front of him, causing the other
driver's death. After the incident, James remained violent and confused. He
subsequently was committed to a state mental health facility, where he had
been a patient on previous occasions. Within three weeks, James was termed
"not dangerous" and released. He was tried for manslaughter but was found
not guilty by reason of insanity on July 15, 1982.1 As a result of that verdict he
again was committed involuntarily only to be released on October 14, 1982,
after a district court decided that he no longer was a threat to himself or
others. 2
On Christmas Eve 1980 Danny discovered that he was the subject of in-
voluntary civil commitment proceedings, even though he had not exhibited
any overt dangerous behavior. Danny spent Christmas Day incarcerated.
During the following three years he was served with twelve commitment peti-
tions that either were dismissed or resulted in short commitments. Released
from his latest incarceration on October 7, 1983, Danny's freedom -remains
subject to the whim of the members of his family.3
James and Danny both are victims of the North Carolina involuntary
civil commitment system. This system is premised on the notion that the state
has the power to place the mentally ill in mental hospitals for the benefit of
themselves and society. In recent years courts have held that substantive due
process requires that before one may be committed involuntarily, the state's
interests in protecting both society and the mentally ill individual must be
shown to outweigh the individuars interest in personal liberty.4 From this
balancing has evolved the "dangerousness standard," which limits the applica-
tion of involuntary civil commitment proceedings to those individuals who are
mentally ill and dangerous to themselves or others. In North Carolina, this
dangerousness is required to be shown by clear, cogent, and convincing evi-
l. In re Autry, No. 81SP 243 (N.C. Union County Dist. Ct. Oct. 16, 1981).
2. In re Autry, No. 82SP 153 (N.C. Union County Dist. Ct. July 15, 1982).
3. See In re Huntley, No. 80SP 244 (N.C. Union County Dist. Ct. Dec. 23, 1980). See also
In re Huntley, No. 83SP 181 (N.C. Union County Dist. Ct. Sept. 22, 1983); In re Huntley, No.
82SP 173 (N.C. Union County Dist. Ct. Aug. 18, 1982); In re Huntley, No. 82SP 040 (N.C. Union
County Dist. Ct. Mar. 11, 1982); In re Huntley, No. 81SP 249 (N.C. Union County Dist. Ct. Oct.
22, 198 1); In re Huntley, No. 81SP 147 (N.C. Union County Dist. Ct. June 18, 1981); In re Hunt-
ley, No. 81SP 004 (N.C. Union County Dist. Ct. Jan. 6, 1981); In re Huntley, No. 80SP 177 (N.C.
Union County Dist. Ct. Sept. 20, 1980); In re Huntley, No. 80SP 157 (N.C. Union County Dist.
Ct. Aug. 27, 1980); In re Huntley, No. 79SP 177 (N.C. Union County Dist. Ct. Aug. 16, 1979); In
re Huntley, No. 79SP 033 (N.C. Union County Dist. Ct. Feb. 28, 1979).
4. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972);
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972). For a general discussion of substantive due process and
its effects on fundamental rights, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNo, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
425-60 (1983).
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dence of recent dangerous behavior.5 This requirement is disturbing because
it exacerbates the two most serious flaws of the dangerousness standard: un-
derinclusiveness and overinclusiveness. Underinclusiveness, such as in the
case of James, occurs when the system fails to detect and commit those indi-
viduals who are dangerous to themselves or others. Overinclusiveness is the
commitment of an individual such as Danny to a mental health facility when
the individual poses no serious danger to anyone. Unfortunately, there often
is no clear standard to determine which individuals should be committed.
Some have even said that the present decision-making process resembles flip-
ping a coin.6
In response to these weaknesses, some commentators have espoused dis-
carding the entire commitment system, 7 while others have suggested a model
based more on capacity for treatment.8 Such drastic changes, however, should
not be adopted hastily by the judiciary. Instead, legislation should be enacted
which requires that dangerousness be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by
evidence that is probative of a substantial risk of harm. This legislation would
diminish the existing overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness problems.
The involuntary civil commitment system used in North Carolina and
throughout the United States is founded on the states' powers to curtail the
liberty of those individuals the states deem dangerous to themselves or others.9
5. To support an inpatient commitment order, the court is required to find, by clear,
cogent and convincing evidence, that the respondent is mentally ill or inebriate, and
dangerous to himself or others, or is mentally retarded, and because of an accompanying
behavior disorder, is dangerous to others. The court shall record the facts which support
its findings.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.7(i) (Cum. Supp. 1983). See also In re Jackson, 60 N.C. App. 581, 583-
84, 299 S.E.2d 677, 679 (1983) (specific application of the standard).
6. Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Prediction of Dangerousness: Flipping Coins in the
Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974).
7. See, e.g., Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Invohmtary Commitment of
the Mentally Disordered, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 54 (1982). Morse makes four arguments against invol-
untary commitment:
First, it is difficult or impossible to support, with theory or data, the differential treatment,
of mentally disordered persons that allows them, but not normal persons to be commit-
ted. Second, the [present] system is unlikely to identify accurately those persons who
should arguably be committed; consequently, large numbers of persons who are not
properly committable will be unjustly and needlessly deprived of their liberty. Third, it
is unlikely that the states will be able to provide the quality of care and treatment for
those committed that is absolutely necessary to justify the enormous deprivation of lib-
erty caused by commitment. Finally, most, and probably all, of the alleged benefits of
involuntary hospitalization can be provided by less intrusive alternatives that are equally
efficacious but cause much less deprivation of liberty.
Id. at 58-59.
8. A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION (1975); Roth, .4 Cam.
mitment Lawfor Patients, Doctors, and Lawyers, 136 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1121 (1979). The Stone-
Roth type proposal recommends commitment only when (I) there has been a convincing diagno-
sis of serious illness; (2) the patient presently is suffering from lack of treatment; (3) treatment is
available; and (4) the patient's objections to treatment are irrational and based on his illness. A,
STONE, supra, at 69.
9. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (Involuntary confinement in most states is
not based solely on medical judgments that the defendant is mentally ill and treatable, but also on
the social and legal judgment that his potential for doing harm to himself or to others is sufficient
to justify such a massive curtailment of liberty.). In re Hatley, 291 N.C. 693, 231 S.E.2d 633 (1977)
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This power to restrict liberty rests on two theories: parenspatriae and the po-
lice power. Parenspatriae° is the sovereign power of guardianship over per-
sons who are unable to care for themselves. " The police power is the inherent
power of the state as sovereign to promote the health, safety, and general wel-
fare of the public.' 2 Courts, in response to due process concerns, have limited
this power to situations in which its application is "'reasonably necessary'"
and "'not unduly oppressive.' "13 Thus, the application of the police power
has come to depend on balancing the interests of society and the affected
individual. 14
Involuntary civil commitment is controlled by statute, and North Caro-
lina's statute' 5 is typical of those nationwide. In North Carolina, a person
may be committed to an inpatient mental health facility only if that person is
shown to be mentally ill or inebriate and dangerous to himself or others, or if
the person is mentally retarded and has a behavior disorder that causes him to
be dangerous to others. 16 Critical to the application of such a statute is how
criteria like mental illness and dangerousness are defined.' 7
Under North Carolina's statute anyone who knows of a person satisfying
the statutory criteria may make a sworn statement to that effect to a designated
judicial official.' 8 This statement, or petition, must set forth the facts upon
which the petitioner bases his belief and must be filed in the county where the
subject individual (respondent) resides or is found.' 9 If the judicial official
finds reasonable grounds to believe the alleged facts, he issues an order di-
recting law enforcement officers to take the respondent into custody for exami-
nation.20 After being taken into custody the respondent must be brought
(There is no constitutional justification for confinement of mentally ill individuals who are not
dangerous and can live safely in freedom.).
10. For an extensive discussion of the development of parenspatriae, see In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1967).
11. State exrel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 157 W. Va. 417, 425-26, 202 S.E.2d 109, 117 (1974).
12. Note, Civil Commitment ofthe Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1190, 1222 (1974). See also
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (explaining the police power).
13. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962) (quoting Lawton v. Steele,
152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894)) (police power applied in the form of zoning held constitutional).
14. Note, supra note 12, at 1223. Today, most commitments are based on the police power.
Due process concerns have limited the exercise of parenspatriae to those situations in which a
person poses a danger to his own safety. See Weissbourd, Involuntary Commitment: The Move
Toward Dangerousness, 15 J. MAR. L. REy. 83, 85-86 (1982) for a discussion of how the police
power now overlaps parenspatriae as the basis for involuntary civil commitment.
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.1 to .27 (1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983). See H. TURNBULL, THE
LAW AND THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED IN NORTH CAROLINA § 5 (2d ed. 1979) (textual treat-
ment of the North Carolina commitment statutes). For a more detailed description and analysis
of the 1979 amendments, see Miller & Fiddleman, Involuntary Civil Commitment in North Caro-
lina: The Result of/he 1979 Statutory Changes, 60 N.C.L. REv. 985 (1982). See also Note, Involun-
tary Outpatient Civil Commitment Expanded- The 1983 Changes in the North Carolina Law, 62
N.C.L. REv. 1158 (1984).
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.1 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
17. See infra notes 34-44.
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.3(a) (1981).
19. Id.
20. Id § 122-58.3(b) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
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before a local mental health official or physician without unnecessary delay.21
If the doctor determines that the respondent is not a proper subject for com-
mitment, he is released.22 If the doctor determines that the respondent is men-
tally ill and dangerous, the respondent then is transferred to a regional mental
health facility.23
At the mental health facility the respondent is examined by another phy-
sician to verify the findings of the local doctor.24 This physician determines
whether to release respondent immediately or set a district court.hearing for
formal commitment. 25 The respondent is entitled to be represented by an at-
torney at the hearing,26 and various evidence is presented ranging from eye-
witness accounts of respondent's actions to technical psychiatric testimony.27
If the judge decides that the respondent should be committed, he makes spe-
cific findings of fact and enters an order committing the respondent for inpa-
tient28 or outpatient 29 treatment at a public3" or private3' mental health
21. Id § 122-58.4(a).
If a physician is not immediately available, the respondent may be temporarily detained
in a community mental health facility, if one is available; if such facility is not available,
he may be detained, under appropriate supervision, in his home, in a private hospital or
clinic, in a general hospital, or in a regional mental health facility, but not in a jail or
other penal facility.
Id
22. Id § 122-58.4(c)(3).
23. Id. § 122-58.4(c)(1).
24. Id § 122-58.6(a), (al).
25. Id § 122-58.6(a).
26. Id § 122-58.7(b) (1981). See generally Note, A Tria/Manual/or Civil Commitment." Chap-
ter Excerpt on the Commitment Hearing, I MENTAL DISABILiTY L. REP. 380 (1977) (discussion of
civil commitment hearing process from the attorney's perspective). For some observations on the
role of an attorney under the North Carolina statutes, see Hiday, The lttorne!r Role in Involun-
tary Civil Commitment, 60 N.C.L. REv. 1027 (1982).
27. Hiday, supra note 26, at 1036-44. During 1979, Hiday and her researchers observed 479
initial commitment hearings in North Carolina and concluded that attorneys for the respondents
were poorly prepared, were inactive at the hearing, and generally deferred to the psychiatrist's
ideas for resolution of the case. Id
28. "To support an inpatient commitment order, the court is required to find, by clear, co-
gent, and convincing evidence, that the respondent is mentally ill or inebriate, and dangerous to
himself or others, or is mentally retarded, and because of an accompanying behavior disorder, is
dangerous to others." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.7(i) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
29. To support outpatient commitment, the court is required to find by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence that:
a. The respondent is mentally ill, and
b. The respondent is capable of surviving safely in the community with available su-
pervision from family, friends or others, and
c. Based on the respondent's treatment history, the respondent is in need of treatment
in order to prevent further disability or deterioration which would predictably result in
dangerousness as defined by G.S. 122-58.2(1), and
d. His current mental status or the nature of his illness limits or negates his ability to
make an informed decision to voluntarily seek or comply with recommended treatment,
the physician shall so indicate on the physician's examination report and shall recom-
mend outpatient commitment. In addition, the examining physician shall indicate the
name, address, and telephone number of the proposed outpatient treatment physician or
center. The person designated in the order to provide transportation shall return the
respondent to his regular residence or to the home of a consenting person, and he shall
be released from custody.
N.C. GEN. STAT. 122-58.4(c)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1983). See Note, supra note 15, at 1158.
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facility.32 At this point, the respondent is officially, involuntarily, civilly
committed. 33
The substantive dangerousness criterion required for involuntary civil
commitment arises within this procedural framework. The dangerousness
standard for involuntary commitment has developed nationally over the last
200 years. A 1788 New York statute provided that those persons who were
"furiously madd" and could not be taken under the care and protection of
friends and relatives could be confined if they were "so far disordered in their
senses that they may be dangerous to be permitted to go abroad."3 4 In 1845
the Massachusetts Supreme Court stated: "[T]he right to restrain an insane
person of his liberty is found in that great law of humanity, which makes it
necessary to confine those whose going at large would be dangerous to them-
selves or others." 35
This "great law of humanity" was entrenched firmly in our jurisprudence
when the United States Supreme Court ruled that dangerousness was a consti-
tutionally sufficient standard for commitment. In O'Connor v. Donaldson36
the Court expressly declined to decide whether that standard was constitution-
30. Public mental health facilities are defined to include community and area mental health
facilities, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-35.24 to -35.57 (1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983), as well as the four
regional mental health facilities in North Carolina. Id. § 122-7 (1981).
31. Commitment to a private mental health facility is allowed at the expense of the respon-
dent if the private facility is licensed by the Department of Human Resources. Id § 122-58.8(c)
(Cum. Supp. 1983).
32. Id § 122-58.8(a)(1).
33. Although the system is efficient, there seems to be a great deal of discretion placed on
each functionary in the process. The petitioner, the judicial officer, the local physician, and the
mental health facility physician all make decisions on short notice and scanty evidence. Two
particularly troublesome features of the process must be noted, although in-depth considerations
of these procedural problems are not within the scope of this discussion.
First, the system provides only for a check on overinclusiveness (by various levels of review),
without taking steps to guard against releasing a very dangerous mentally disturted individual.
Obviously, not all dangerous mentally ill individuals can be detected through simple examination;
once an overworked emergency room doctor releases a respondent without proper examination,
however, there is a great likelihood that if the individual was actually mentally ill and dangerous,
he is now mentally ill, dangerous, and furious with those relatives or friends who tried to "put him
away."
Second, the initial custodial confinement should be cause for concern. The first hours of
custody are the most traumatic. Custody of the respondent is taken in the same manner as arrest
warrants are executed. Often respondent is handcuffed, and, if he gives any indication of violence,
he may be placed in leg irons. Unfortunately, the experience is made worse by the fact that unlike
arrest warrants, which make clear what the respondent is charged with doing, commitment peti-
tions do not provide law enforcement officers or the respondent with any answer to respondent's
repeated question: "Why?" The individual is ripped from his environment and thrown into a
world of patrol cars, hospitals, and strangers. Even if the respondent is soon released, he still may
have been affected seriously by this short period of deprivation.
34. N.Y. Laws of 1788, ch. 31, citedin Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1085 (E.D. Wis.
1972), vacated and remandedfor a more speckfic order, 414 U.S. 473 (1974) (per curiam).
35. In re Josiah Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 123 (Mass. 1845).
36. 422 U.S. 563 (1975). Kenneth Donaldson was involuntarily confined in a mental institu-
tion for 15 years despite the fact that he posed no danger to others and was not believed likely to
harm himself. Donaldson brought suit seeking release and the district court granted relief, finding
that his constitutional right to liberty had been violated. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit affirmed, Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). The Supreme Court agreed that Donaldson's
confinement was unconstitutional, but attempted to limit its holding to the facts of the case.
1984]
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ally required,37 but it implicitly recommended such a standard: The Court
noted that a state "cannot constitutionally confine without more a
nondangerous individual."38 This statement implies that the state can justify
the commitment of an individual on a showing of dangerousness, but that
anything less might pose a constitutional problem. The lower courts have
interpreted the language to mean that an involuntary commitment is justified
only when an individual is dangerous. 39 To avoid having their state proce-
dure declared unconstitutional, most state legislatures established dangerous-
ness as the criterion for commitment of the mentally ill.40 Thus, in North
Carolina, as well as in the vast majority of states, dangerousness is the linchpin
of the involuntary commitment statute.41
"Dangerousness" is an amorphous concept and its application as a stan-
dard for commitment is dependent upon statutory interpretation. The defini-
tions in the North Carolina statutes are typical of those in many
jurisdictions. 42 "Dangerous to himself" means "that within the recent past:"
1. The person has acted in such manner as to evidence:
I. That he would be unable without care, supervision, and the
continued assistance of others not otherwise available, to ex-
ercise self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct
of his daily responsibilities and social relations, or to satisfy
his need for nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter,
or self-protection and safety; and
II. That there is a reasonable probability of serious physical
debilitation to him within the near future unless adequate
treatment is afforded pursuant to this Article. A showing of
behavior that is grossly irrational or of actions which the
person is unable to control or of behavior that is grossly in-
Under a due process balancing approach, the Court held that none of the State's interests justified
Donaldson's continued confinement. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 574.
37. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 573.
38. Id at 576. The Court expressly did not decide:
whether, when, or by what procedures, a mentally ill person may be confined by the
State on any of the grounds which, under contemporary statutes, are generally advanced
to justify involuntary confinement of such a person--to prevent injury to the public, to
ensure his own survival or safety, or to alleviate or cure his illness.
Id at 573.
39. See, e.g., Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509 (D. Neb. 1975) (finding Nebraska civil
commitment statutes unconstitutional for failure to require that the mentally ill person be danger-
ous to himself or other people); Commonwealth ex rel. Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa. Super. 155, 339
A.2d 764 (1975) (state's requirement that respondent be "in need of care" is impermissibly vague
and suggests a dangerousness standard), appeal dismissed, 424 U.S. 960 (1976).
40. See Note, Overt Dangerous Behavior as a Constitutional Requirementfor Involuntary Civil
Commitment of the Mentally 111, 44 U. CHi. L. REv. 562, 562 (1977) (Eight states-Alabama, Cali-
fornia, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Nebraska, North Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin-re-
formed their statutes within approximately one year of the O'Connor decision.). See also Beis,
State Involuntary Commitment Statutes, 7 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REV. 358 (1983) (All states ex-
cept New Jersey statutorily required dangerousness for involuntary commitment as of 1983.).
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.1 (Cum. Supp. 1983); In re Collins, 49 N.C. App. 243, 250,271
S.E.2d 72, 76 (1980) (In commitment proceeding, district court must find that the subject of the
proceeding is dangerous to himself or others.).
42. For a comparison of statutory requirements of all fifty states, see Beis, supra note 40,
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appropriate to the situation or other evidence of severely im-
paired insight and judgment shall create a prima facie
inference that the person is unable to care for himself; or
2. The person has attempted suicide or threatened suicide and that
there is a reasonable probability of suicide unless adequate treat-
ment is afforded under this Article; or
3. The person has mutilated himself or attempted to mutilate him-
self and that there is a reasonable probability of serious self-mu-
tilation unless adequate treatment is afforded under this
Article.43
A person is "dangerous to others" if,
within the recent past, the person has inflicted or attempted to inflict
or threatened to inflict serious bodily harm on another or has acted
in such a manner as to create a substantial risk of serious bodily
harm to another and. . . there is a reasonable probability that such
conduct will be repeated.44
Commitment under these definitions involves two questions: (1) What is
sufficient evidence of dangerousness? and (2) What standard of proof of dan-
gerousness should be required? It is in the resolution of these two issues that
reformation of the current standards is needed.
A commitment proceeding is dismissed if there is insufficient evidence
from which a reasonable person could find dangerousness. 45 The problems of
overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness in the commitment process can be
minimized by selecting the proper standard for sufficiency. Essentially, the
standard reflects a policy decision of who should be confined-those who com-
mit overt dangerous acts, or those who psychiatrists believe pose a substantial
risk of harm to themselves or others. Three alternative sufficiency standards
have emerged without any one gaining particular favor. Some states require
evidence that the mentally ill individual has committed a recent overt act that
posed a risk of substantial harm to himself or others.46 Other states have re-
fined that alternative also to require evidence that there is an imminent danger
that such harmful conduct will be repeated.47 The majority of states, however,
have a more relaxed standard which merely requires evidence that the individ-
ual poses a substantial risk of harm to himself or others.4 8
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.2(1)(a) (1981).
44. Id. § 122-58.2(1)(b).
45. C. MCCORMICK, McCoRMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 338, at 789-90
(E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972). See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.11, at 268-79 (2d ed.
1977).
46. See ALA. CODE § 22-52-10(c) (Cum. Supp. 1983); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5300(c)
(West Supp. 1983-84) (within seven days of being taken into custody); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-
1(12) (1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34B, § 3864(6)(A) (Supp. 1983-84); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 253B.02 (West Supp. 1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1009 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7301
(Purdon Supp. 1983-84); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7101(17) (Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 71.05.020(1)-(3), 71.05.150(4) (Supp. 1984-85).
47. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-1401(a)-(c), -1404 to -1410 (Cum. Supp. 1981); HAWAII REV.
STAT. §§ 334-1, -60(b)(1) (Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-21-102(14), -129 (1983).
48. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.070(i) (1979); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-540 (Supp. 1983);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10-111 (1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-178(c) (West Supp. 1984);
1984]
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Until quite recently, the national trend had been toward the recent-overt-
act standard.49 In Lessard v. Schmidt50 a federal district court determined
that the Wisconsin commitment statute was not vague or overbroad by infer-
ring a requirement that "dangerousness" be evinced by a "recent overt act,
attempt or threat to do substantial harm to oneself or another."' The court
based its interpretation of "dangerousness" on the need to be cautious before
depriving anyone of liberty and upon an express suspicion of the reliablity of
psychiatric prediction.5 2 Lessard and similar cases frequently have been cited
to support states' decisions to adopt the recent-overt-act standard.53
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394-467 (West 1983); IDAHO CODE § 66-329(k) (Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 91 , § 1-119 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-84); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-14-9.1-10(d) (Burns Supp,
1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.11 (West Supp. 1983-84); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2902(a) (1983);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.026 (Bobbs-Merrill 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:55(E) (West
Supp. 1984); MD. HEALTH-GENERAL CODE ANN. § 10-617 (Cum. Supp. 1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 123, § 1 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.800(401) (Callaghan 1980); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 41-21-61 (1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 632.300 (Vernon 1984); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 433A.310(1) (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-B:38 (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-3(L)
(1979); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.37(a) (McKinney 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.1 (Cum.
Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE §25-03.1-02(11) (Supp. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5122.01(B) (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 52.1(1)(2) (West Supp. 1983-84); OR. REV.
STAT. § 426.005 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-580 (Law. Co-op. Cum. Supp. 1983); S.D. CoDi-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 27A-1-1 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-604 (Supp. 1983); TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 5547-33(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-36(b)(10) (Supp.
1983); VA. CODE § 37-1-67.3 (Cum. Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE § 27-1-12 (Cum. Supp. 1983); Wis,
STAT. ANN. § 51.20(1) (West Supp. 1983-84); Wyo. STAT. § 25-10-101 (1982).
49. See Note, supra note 40, at 562.
50. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remandedfor a more spec/Ic order, 414
U.S. 473 (1974) (per curian).
Alberta Lessard was taken into custody by two police officers in front of her home and taken
to a mental health center. The police officers filled out an "Emergency Detention for Mental
Observation" form at the center and Lessard was detained there on an emergency basis. The same
officers restated the allegations of mental illness contained in the emergency petition before a
county court judge three days later and the judge issued an order "permitting Miss Lessard's
detention for an additional ten days." Id at 1081. Lessard was represented at a commitment
hearing held 26 days after her initial confinement by an attorney she obtained. At the hearing the
county court judge ordered Lessard to be committed for 30 additional days. The judge provided
"no reasons for his order except to state that he found Miss Lessard to be 'mentally ill.'" Al-
though the hospital authorities "permitted Miss Lessard to go home on an out-patient 'parole'
basis," the thirty-day commitment order had been extended for one month for each month until
the review by the federal district court. Id. at 1082.
In the federal suit, brought as a class action on behalf of Lessard and those similarly situated
in the state of Wisconsin, Lessard alleged that the Wisconsin procedure for involuntary civil com-
mitment denied her due process of law on several grounds. One of her primary allegations was
that commitment of a person violates due process when it is made without a determination that
the person is in need of commitment beyond a reasonable doubt. Id
51. Id at 1093.
52. Id at 1093-96.
53. See, e.g., Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 449-51 (S.D. Iowa 1976) (lack of overt
act requirement was a factor in the court holding that the statute violated due process); Doremus
v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 513-14 (D. Neb. 1975) (compelling interest standard in justifying
confinement requires a dangerousness standard based on overt dangerous behavior); Common-
wealth ex rel Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa. Super. 155, 181-84, 339 A.2d 764, 778-79 (1975) (commit-
ment linked to problems of prediction--one cannot be committed without some overt act and a
conclusion that the probability of such acts recurring is substantial), appealdsmissed, 424 U.S. 960
(1976).
Other cases have developed the theory behind the Lessardstandard more fully. As one court
noted:
A mere expectancy that danger-productive behavior might be engaged in does not rise to
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It often is difficult to decide whether certain actions constitute overtly
dangerous behavior. No case ever has determined that a particular act is per
se overtly dangerous, 54 and statutes and commentators offer, at best, general
definitions subject to conflicting interpretations.55 Dangerousness is a func-
tion of the particular characteristics of an individual in a unique situation. In
a practical sense, we are left with a subjective "I know it when I see it"
standard.5 6
There is some sentiment that the Lessard court did not go far enough
towards requiring a substantial showing of dangerousness. For example, in
Suzuki v. Yuen5 7 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that danger to oneself or others not only must be proven by overt acts but
also must be imminent before involuntary commitment is constitutionally
acceptable.58
The Suzukiholding is by no means overinclusive. It, however, effectively
renders a state "powerless" to protect its citizens from an individual who pos-
sesses serious destructive potential, but has not manifested this potential in a
recent overt act or in a manner to suggest imminent violence.59 In addition,
the imminence requirement stands as a blatant rejection of the predictions of
dangerousness by mental health professionals. Although there is some reason
the level of legal significance when the consequence of such an evaluation is involuntary
confinement. To confine a citizen against his will because he is likely to be dangerous in
the future, it must be shown that he has actually been dangerous in the recent past and
that such danger was manifested by an overt act, attempt or threat to do substantial harm
to himself or to another.
Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 391 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
54. See Note, supra note 40, at 576.
55. See id. at 577. One commentator has defined overt dangerous behavior as "behavior that
could reasonably be regarded as presenting a risk of substantial physical harm to others or to the
actor, or as demonstrating an inability to survive in freedom." Id. at 579. This definition adds
little to the ability of mental health officials and judges to make well-reasoned decisions.
56. Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I know it when
I see it" definition of pornography).
57. 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980).
"Plaintiff Suzuki sought a writ of habeas corpus and release from her involuntary commit-
ment to" a Hawaii psychiatric facility in 1973. "She also sought a declaratory judgment that
portions of Hawaii's mental health laws [were] unconstitutional, and an injunction against the
involuntary commitment of persons under those statutes." Pursuant to that action, "the district
judge declared Hawaii's procedures for involuntary civil commitment unconstitutional." Id. at
175 (citing Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Hawaii 1976)). The district court "re-
tained jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of any curative legislation." id. at 173.
After Hawaii's passage of new commitment statutes in 1976, plaintiff brought a second suit
seeking a declaration that portions of the new law were unconstitutional. The district court
granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Suzuki v. Alba, 438 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Hawaii
1977), af'd inpart andrev'd inpart sub nom Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980). The
State appealed the court's decision and sought review of several points. Foremost of these conten-
tions was the district court's holding that the statute unconstitutionally failed to specify that only
"imminently dangerous" persons may be committed. Id at 1110.
58. Suzuki, 617 F.2d at 178. The court's decision was influenced by dicta from Lessard.
[That] the potential for doing harm be great enough to justify such a massive curtailment
of liberty implies a balancing test in which the state must bear the burden of proving that
there is an extreme likelihood that if the person is not confined he will do immediate
harm to himself or others.
Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1093 (emphasis added), cited in SuzukC4 617 F.2d at 178.
59. United States ex rel. Mathew v. Nelson, 461 F. Supp. 707, 711 (N.D. I1. 1978).
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for the court's distrust,60 the suspicion of psychiatric prediction should be
dealt with in a more constructive manner.
Recently, courts have halted the trend toward favoring the individual in
the substantive due process balancing of interests. Two key decisions have
upheld the constitutionality of commitment statutes that require neither recent
overt acts nor imminent danger, but merely a finding of a substantial risk of
harm to others or oneself. The first of these cases was Hatcher v. Wachtel6' in
which the court reasoned that dangerousness was linked inextricably with an
individual's situation. Therefore, a court "must take into account the likeli-
hood that defendant will be exposed to such situations or come into contact
with such individuals" that would bring about such a dangerous situation. 62
Since neither the imminent danger nor overt act test considers such possibili-
ties, the court was satisfied that the "substantial risk of harm" approach was
superior.63 The second major case reversing the trend was Project Release P.
Prevost,64 in which the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York upheld New York's use of the substantial-risk-of-harm standard.
Rejecting an argument for a recent-overt-act-and-imminent-danger stan-
dard,65 the court concluded that a factfinder should not have to wait until an
individual's conduct has made serious harm inevitable before acting to pre-
vent it.66 The court made it clear that involuntary commitments are based on
a prediction/prevention model and not an act/punishment -model; thus, no
particular act necessarily should be required before preventive steps are
taken.67
There are several other reasons why the substantial-risk-of-harm standard
has been embraced by the courts. There has been no showing that the recent
commission of an overt act makes such a future act more likely. 6 8 In fact,
frequently a psychiatrist can determine that a subject is reasonably expected to
60. See generally Ennis & Litwack, supra note 6, at 697-734. The authors note that at least 60
to 70% of the people whom psychiatrists judge to be dangerous may be harmless. Id. Also, the
authors argue that psychiatrists should not be permitted to testify as experts in civil commitment
proceedings because psychiatric judgments are not sufficiently reliable or valid to justify their
admissibility under traditional rules of evidence. Id at 734-43.
61. 269 S.E.2d 849 (V. Va. 1980).
62. Id at 852.
63. Id See also Commonwealth v. Nassar, 406 N.E.2d 1286 (Mass. 1980), in which the court
noted that its higher standard of proof obviated the need to require specific acts or imminent
danger to avoid overinclusive commitments. Id at 1291. The court reasoned that the more serious
the anticipated harm, the less important the requirement of imminence. Id
64. 551 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). Project Release, a nonprofit organization, brought
action challenging the constitutionality of New York commitment procedures. Id at 1299.
Among other claims for relief, Project Release sought to have the court hold that proof of immi-
nent danger, demonstrated by a recent overt act, is required for any civil commitment, Id at
1303-04.
65. Id at 1304.
66. Id at 1305.
67. Id The court stated: "Regardless, an impartial factfinder, guided by medical documenta-
tion, should be permitted to determine that mental illness is present and danger likely without
waiting for an individual's conduct to make serious physical harm all but inevitable." Id.
68. United States ex rel. Mathew v. Nelson, 461 F. Supp. 707, 710 (N.D. I11. 1978);
Note, supra note 40, at 584.
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injure himself or another even though there is no history of an overt act.6 9
Moreover, it is in the best interests of the individual and society that a state be
able to prevent a mentally ill person from committing a dangerous act.
Nevertheless, it must be recognized that the recent-overt-act requirement
has some merit. That standard provides the judge with a concrete threshold
upon which to decide a motion to dismiss. He can base his decision on the
presence or absence of a particular element, not on his interpretations of am-
biguous medical diagnoses and predictions.70 Any constitutional problem of
vagueness also is overcome by such a standard.71 The facts leading to a deci-
sion can be described with specificity. The standard also avoids punishment
for status; the requirement of some act or attempt lessens the likelihood that
someone will be taken into custody merely because he is mentally ill.72 Al-
though there would continue to be confinement for achieving the status of
mentally ill and dangerous, this punishment would have a more articulable
basis.73
For many of these reasons, a requirement of either recent dangerous be-
havior or imminent danger would prove to be a satisfactory standard of evi-
dentiary sufficiency. The question, however, is which standard is most
satisfactory. North Carolina formerly required harm to be imminent before
allowing commitment, but this requirement was deleted in 1979. 74 Today,
North Carolina is considered to be a "substantial risk of harm" state.75 The
statute, however, appears to require some recent dangerous action as a prereq-
uisite to certain involuntary commitments.76 By deleting the requirement of
"imminent" harm, North Carolina has taken a positive step, but a further step
can be taken by the unambiguous adoption of the substantial-risk-of-harm
standard. Under this broader standard, a recent, overt, dangerous act still
would be given great weight by a factfinder. The medical community, how-
ever, could continue its input by improving its predictive capabilities. 77 Fur-
69. United States ex rel. Mathew v. Nelson, 461 F. Supp. 707, 711 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
70. Note, supra note 40, at 586-87.
71. Id. at 587-89. For cases holding the vagueness doctrine applicable to civil commitment,
see United States ex rel. Mathew v. Nelson, 461 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. I1. 1978) (expectation of harm
statute not vague); In re Salem, 31 N.C. App. 57, 228 S.E.2d 649 (1976).
72. Note, supra note 40, at 589-91. But see People v. Sansone, 18 Ill. App. 3d 315, 324, 309
N.E.2d 733, 739 (1974) (punishment for status argument summarily rejected).
73. Often the recent-overt-act requirement and imminent danger alternatives are offered to
overcome the perceived unreliability of psychiatric prediction. With evidence of an overt act or
imminent danger a factfinder feels more comfortable in reaching the decision that the probability
of future dangerousness is high enough to justify incarceration.
74. In re Collins, 49 N.C. App. 243, 250, 271 S.E.2d 72, 76 (1980). See Miller & Fiddleman
supra note 15, at 993.
75. In re Monroe, 49 N.C. App. 23, 31, 270 S.E.2d 537, 541 (1980) ("This court has not
required 'overt acts' under the former standard of 'imminent' danger and the present statutory
definition of 'dangerous to others' does not require a finding of 'overt acts.' ").
76. See N.C. GEN STAT. § 122-58.2 (1981). In defining "dangerous to himself" this statute
uses the language "within the recent past ... the person has acted in such a mamer as to evi-
dence" his danger to himself. The definition of "dangerous to others" in the statute explicitly
requires acts that create a substantial risk of harm. Id.
77. Predictive capabilities in the area of mental health are improving. Recent studies appear
to demonstrate that the reliability and validity of mental disorder diagnoses have increased over
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thermore, the standard would enable the State to prevent potential harmful
acts. Most importantly, the suggested standard would protect against the un-
derinclusiveness of a required-prior-act standard.
It is clear that this broader evidentiary standard, while alleviating possible
underinclusiveness, has the potential for creating an equally harmful result-
overinclusiveness. It must be recognized, however, that the evidentiary stan-
dard is only one factor in the commitment system. To understand fully how
the substantial-risk-of-harm standard better suits the present needs of the sys-
tem, one must consider the other major factor: the standard of proof. The
threshold standard of proof required in a judicial process "serves to allocate
the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance
attached to the ultimate decision. '78 It "reflects the value society places on
individual liberty." 79 There are three general standards of proof: proof by a
preponderance of the evidence, proof that is clear and convincing, and proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.80
The Supreme Court already has narrowed the choice. In Addington v.
Texas8s plaintiff argued that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was constitu-
tionally required for an involuntary commitment. The Texas Supreme Court
held that a mere preponderance standard satisfied due process.8 2 The
Supreme Court reversed, concluding that "the individual's interest in the out-
come of a civil commitment proceeding is of such weight and'gravity that due
process requires the state to justify confinement by proof more substantial than
a mere preponderance of the evidence."'83
Unfortunately, the Court did not stop there. It intimated that the reason-
able doubt standard had great weaknesses when applied to civil commit-
ment.84 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, provided four reasons for
not adopting the reasonable doubt standard. First, the reasonable doubt stan-
dard should be reserved to cases where "state power is . ..exercised in a
punitive sense."85 Second, the sense of importance given the reasonable doubt
standard would be diluted if used outside the criminal justice system.86 Third,
the danger of an erroneous commitment is less undesirable than the risk of an
erroneous criminal conviction because "the layers of professional review and
observation of the patient's condition, and the concern of family and friends
generally will provide continuous opportunities for an erroneous commitment
to be corrected."87 Finally, the Chief Justice argued that problems of diagno-
the last five years. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 5 (3d ed,
1980).
78. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
79. Id at 425 (quoting Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir. 1971)).
80. F. JAEas & G. HAzARD, supra note 45, at 243-45.
81. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
82. State v. Addington, 557 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. 1977), vacateg 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
83. Addington, 441 U.S. at 427.
84. Id at 428-29.
85. Id at 428.
86. Id
87. Id at 428-29.
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sis and prediction raise serious questions whether dangerousness ever could be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.8 8 Thus, almost by a process of elimina-
tion, the Court recommended a clear and convincing evidence standard of
proof.8
9
Addington served as the impetus for major changes in the quantum of
proof required by most jurisdictions for a civil commitment. Today, nearly all
states, including North Carolina, 90 have employed some form of the clear and
convincing evidence standard.91 This trend has been more reactionary than
rational. Addington clearly held a mere preponderance standard constitution-
ally unacceptable. 92 Addington, however, neither held that a clear and con-
vincing evidence standard must be used nor forbade the use of a reasonable
doubt standard.93 The Court specifically stated that although a clear and con-
vincing evidence standard was sufficient, states are free to require a more strin-
gent standard of proof.94 The issue, then, is whether and why a state would
want a standard of proof higher than clear and convincing evidenoe.
Some of the problems of an overinclusive system probably could be reme-
died through a more thorough examination of the evidence offered to prove
the need for commitment. The reasonable doubt standard of proof would en-
courage this greater scrutiny by impressing upon the factfinder the significance
of his decision. The use of this standard in civil commitment proceedings
hardly would detract from the seriousness with which criminal trials and pun-
ishment are taken; few lay jurors will be aware of which standards are used in
which arenas. Moreover, today's emphasis on preventive detention through
civil commitment makes the differentiation between criminal cases and civil
commitment somewhat unwarranted; detention entails the deprivation of the
same rights in either context.
The Chief Justice argues that a higher standard of proof is not required
by assuming that an erroneous commitment is more easily corrected than an
erroneous conviction.95 His argument is not necessarily true. There are more
avenues for relief available to the convicted criminal than to the committed
individual.96 The family and friends of the individual also may prove to be
88. Id. at 429.
89. Id. at 432-33.
90. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.7(i) (1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
91. All states except Massachusetts, which demands proof beyond a reasonable doubt, pres-
ently apply some form of a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof to the issues of mental
illness and dangerousness. See Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg, 374 Mass. 271, 275-77, 372
N.E.2d 242, 245-46 (1978) (court construed MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, §§ 7-8 (Michie/Law. Co-
op. 1981) to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt); infra note 99. See also supra notes 46-48
(other states' statutes digested).
92. Addington, 441 U.S. at 427.
93. Id. at 433 ("[D]etermination of the precise burden equal to or greater than the 'clear and
convincing' standard which we hold is required to meet due process guarantees is a matter of state
law.").
94. Id.
95. Id. at 428-29.
96. Although it may be true that there is more periodic review in the involuntary commit-
ment system than the criminal system, the involuntarily committed individual is not benefitted by
programs such as prisoners' rights projects and parole hearings, or by imaginative appeals and
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more of a hindrance than an aid in correcting a wrongful commitment.97
Finally, contrary to the Chief Justice's opinion, commitments are not im-
possible under a reasonable doubt standard. Scores of individuals have been
committed under this standard prior to and since Addington.98 Nonetheless, a
reasonable doubt standard for involuntary civil commitment rarely is consid-
ered by state legislators, who perhaps are concerned only with providing mini-
mal protection to the mentally ill. The State could ensure that the mentally ill
are given more than just minimal protection while still providing an effective
procedural mechanism for the protection of society from dangerous individu-
als, however, by adopting a reasonable doubt standard of dangerousness.
The present system of involuntary civil commitment can be improved
greatly by adopting two interdependent proposals. The present system's un-
derinclusiveness could be relieved partially by enacting a broad evidentiary
sufficiency standard requiring only evidence that a mentally ill individual
poses a substantial risk of harm to himself or others. At the same time, the
adoption of a reasonable doubt standard of proof would impress upon the trier
of fact the seriousness of the proceedings and reduce overinclusiveness by en-
couraging more meticulous scrutiny of the evidence.
Although these proposals are facially paradoxical-loosening standards
at one point and tightening them at another-the result should be an improve-
ment in the system. The adoption of both proposals would make a positive
substantive statement. There are people who are so dangerous to themselves
or others, that the interests of society in safety outweighs the individuals' inter-
est in personal freedom. Therefore, a decision-maker should consider any evi-
dence which is predictive of whether or not there is a substantial risk of harm
to the mentally ill person or others; but because as a society we are serious
about protecting the interests of the individual and the state, the decision-
maker should also diligently and meticulously apply a very high standard of
proof in determining whether involuntary commitment would appropriately
balance those interests.
Hatcher v. Wachte199 and Project Release v. Prevostt°° indicate that the
courts generally are accepting the broader sufficiency standard. The reason-
able doubt standard of proof, however, is the stumbling block of the proposal.
In a criminal case, "beyond a reasonable doubt" connotes near certainty.' 01
jail-house lawyers. Often, once the individual is committed, whether by error or not, he is forgot-
ten by society and, unlike the criminally convicted, the mentally ill person rarely has the ability to
call attention to himself.
97. See, eg., supra note 3 and accompanying text.
98. The reasonable doubt standard of proof currently is employed in Massachusetts and was
used in Rhode Island until 1982. The involuntary commitment has not vanished in either of these
states. See generally D. LELOS, P. LIPsIrr, A. MCGARRY & R. SCHW1TZOEBEL, CIVIL COMMrIT-
MENT AND SOCIAL POLICY: AN EVALUATION OF THE MASSACHUSETTS MENTAL HEALTH REFORM
ACT OF 1970. (U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services Monograph Series on Crime and Delin-
quency, 1981).
99. 269 S.E.2d 849 (W. Va. 1980).
100. 551 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
101. See State v. Harris, 233 N.C. 697, 703, 28 S.E.2d 232, 237 (1943) and cases cited therein.
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Outside the criminal context, however, beyond a reasonable doubt may be
seen as something slightly less than near certainty. Evidence in commitment
proceedings is much more amorphous and subject to varying interpretations
than in the criminal context. Because the purpose of commitment proceedings
is to foresee and prevent dangerous behavior, rather than to decide whether a
specific crime has been commited, the trier of fact expects a greater amount of
uncertainty in the evidence. In the criminal context, the trier of fact hears
evidence of what did happen, while in the commitment process, the trier hears
evidence of what might happen. The trier expects greater uncertainty in the
proof of future events than of past.102 Thus, the threshold of beyond a reason-
able doubt will be satisfied more easily in civil commitment because the
factfinder has a lower expectation of certainty.
The substantive effects of a reasonable doubt standard of proof must be
given more analysis than whether the standard seems appropriate based on its
use in criminal cases. Civil commitments have occurred under the reasonable
doubt standard in two states, 10 3 in settings in which the level of certainty ap-
parently was lower than it would have been in a criminal case. The difference
between the proof required by this lessened reasonable doubt standard, and
that required by the clear and convincing evidence standard, is the amount of
proof that is necessary to tighten the system and reduce overinclusiveness.
Even though the reasonable doubt standard is not applied as stringently
in a civil commitment case as it would be in a criminal case, the standard
raises the level of seriousness with which a trier of fact approaches the prob-
lem. Judge Haynsworth has written: "[H]owever meaningful the distinction
may be to us as judges, . . . it is greatly to be doubted that a jury's verdict
would ever be influenced by the choice of one standard or the other."'104 This
Note demonstrates that how the standard of proof is described is not as impor-
tant as how the description affects the fact finder. Therefore, using "unequivo-
cal" and "beyond a reasonable doubt" will increase the scrutiny to be applied
to the evidence, but neither is intended to be, nor should it be, taken literally.
Considering the flaws of the present system, the use of a reasonable doubt
standard simply raises the threshold of proof to a more appropriate level.
Ideally, only those individuals who are mentally ill and who pose a seri-
ous risk of harm to themselves or others would be incarcerated through the
involuntary civil commitment process. To say that the present system even
approaches that goal is unrealistic. The combination of a lack of detailed psy-
chiatric and medical evaluation and a concern for substantive due process
rights have convoluted our goals. Individuals who should be committed often
102. The trier of fact will expect greater uncertainty in a civil commitment case than in a
criminal case. Thus, a greater measure of doubt than in a criminal case will be able to exist before
it rises to a "reasonable doubt," thereby preventing commitment. A "reasonable doubt" will exist
when the amount of doubt exceeds that amount which the trier of fact already expects to exist in
the finding.
103. See supra note 98.
104. Tippet v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1158-59 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. disrtsed sub nom
Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972).
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are not, while others who may not be dangerous often are taken from their
environment and secluded from society. The solution to this problem rests
with our legislatures. No one can blame the judiciary for being concerned
with due process; that is its duty in our society. Nor can one fault the medical
community for its desire to provide treatment to all who might need it. The
legislature has the power to reform the system and it must do so. Merely by
requiring evidence of substantial risk of harm as the sufficiency standard, the
legislature would free judges to study each case in its own perspective, uncol-
ored by some talismanic requirement like overt acts. This broad evidentiary
standard can be counterbalanced by a beyond a reasonable doubt standard of
proof that impresses upon the factfinder the seriousness of the decison he must
make. If these two proposals are adopted in tandem we can begin to cope with
the problems of both overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness that presently
haunt our involuntary civil commitment system.
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